Is Marriage Always Good for Children? Evidence from Families Affected by Incarceration by Keith Finlay & David Neumark
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










Finlay is Assistant Professor of Economics at Tulane University. Neumark is Professor of Economics
at UCI, research associate of the NBER, and research fellow at IZA. We are grateful to Marianne Bitler,
Richard Blundell, Paul Devereaux, Daiji Kawaguchi, Francesca Mazzolari, Jim Raymo, Giuseppe
Ragusa, Jeffrey Wooldridge, and seminar participants at Hitotsubashi University, Osaka University,
Tulane University, UCI, University College London, and University College Dublin for helpful comments.
The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2008 by Keith Finlay and David Neumark. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.Is Marriage Always Good for Children? Evidence from Families Affected by Incarceration
Keith Finlay and David Neumark




One-third of children in the United States are born to unmarried parents. A substantial number of black
and Hispanic children live with a never-married mother. Children of never-married mothers are more
likely to drop out of high school, repeat grades, and have behavioral problems than are children raised
in more traditional family structures. But these relationships may be driven by other factors that affect
marital status at birth, post-conception marriage decisions, and later child outcomes, rather than causal
effects of family structure. 
Given that changes in the availability of men in the marriage market should affect marriage decisions,
we use incarceration rates for men as an instrumental variable for family structure in estimating the
effect of never-married motherhood on the likelihood that children drop out of high school, focusing
on blacks and Hispanics. Instrumental variables estimates suggest that unobserved factors rather than
a causal effect drive the negative relationship between never-married motherhood and child outcomes
for blacks and Hispanics, at least for the children of women whose marriage decisions are most affected
by variation in incarceration rates for men. For Hispanics, in particular, we find evidence that these
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A growing proportion of children live with mothers who have never married. Children raised by 
never-married mothers are more likely to repeat a grade in school, be expelled or suspended from school, 
and be treated for an emotional problem than children living with both biological parents (Dawson 1991). 
Given the strong cross-sectional correlations between traditional, two-parent family structures and positive 
outcomes for children, marriage promotion policies have been touted as a strategy for improving the 
socioeconomic outcomes of poor, single mothers and their children.
1 These policies provide incentives or 
support to begin or maintain marriages. While some recent community-based programs have been directed 
at middle-class, white families (Macomber et al. 2005), arguably the largest recent federal 
marriage-promotion policies have been the 1996 welfare reform legislation and the Healthy Marriage 
Initiative included in the 2006 TANF reauthorization, which target low-income, unmarried mothers. For 
example, two of the stated goals of the 1996 welfare reforms were to prevent out-of-wedlock childbearing 
and to encourage the formation of two-parent families. There are also pro-marriage policies at the state and 
local level (Edin and Reed 2005), and a push to extend community-based programs to focus on poor women 
in urban settings (Lichter 2001). Policymakers argue that marriage is one of the most effective ways of 
improving outcomes for poor mothers and their children.
2 
Marriage promotion policies are built upon the conjecture that marriage itself will directly improve 
outcomes for single mothers and their children. But the effects of policy may differ substantially from what 
is revealed by cross-sectional relationships because of endogenous selection on unobservables at both the 
individual and environmental level. For example, perhaps the worst prospective female parents do not get 
married. Alternatively, the potential spouses available to those on the margin of getting married may be of 
sufficiently low quality that it is in the interest of their children for some women to forego marriage. And 
                                                      
1 See, e.g., Rector and Pardue (2004). 
2 This argument has arisen frequently, in one form or another, over the past 40 plus years. Significant or at least 
high-profile milestones include: Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s (1965) report on black families; Vice President 
Daniel Quayle’s criticism of the out-of-wedlock childrearing of television character Murphy Brown as mocking “the 
importance of fathers” (http://www.mfc.org/pfn/95-12/quayle.html, accessed October 8, 2007); and the 
aforementioned efforts to include marriage-promotion policies in welfare-reform legislation under both Presidents 
Clinton and Bush.  
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finally, marriage may be less common among adults facing worse economic (and other) environments, and 
these environments may influence child outcomes. In such cases, fiscal resources devoted to encouraging 
marriage may be misguided or at least ineffective and might be better directed toward increasing the human 
capital of parents, improving the environments faced by poor families, or investing in family planning. 
A critical question, therefore, is whether the relationship between family structure and child 
outcomes is causal. Despite the overwhelming evidence that children living in non-intact families have 
worse outcomes on average, there is little consensus about the causal effects of family structure. Clearly 
researchers and policymakers should be wary of drawing conclusions about the causal effects of family 
structure on child outcomes from cross-sectional statistical associations.   
This paper estimates the causal effects of never-married motherhood on whether children drop out 
of high school. Our research design is based on an instrumental variables (IV) approach. In particular, in 
order to account for the endogeneity of family structure, we instrument for whether a child’s mother has 
ever been married using the incarceration rate for men that is specific to the year, the state of residence, and 
the mother’s race or ethnicity. For blacks, almost all marriages are between same-race spouses, and the 
same is true by ethnicity for less-educated Hispanics, so for these groups state-year variation by race and 
ethnicity in incarceration rates has a direct effect on the “supply” of potential husbands in the marriage 
market.
3 The IV estimator has a local average treatment effect interpretation, estimating a causal effect for 
families whose structure would be changed by variation in race-specific or ethnicity-specific incarceration 
rates if those incarceration rates were randomly assigned. Given that incarcerated men tend to have less 
education and lower earnings and that there is positive assortative mating, this causal effect is particularly 
interesting in the context of policies to encourage marriage among poor families. Differences between the 
estimates with and without accounting for endogenous selection suggest that unobservable factors drive the 
observed adverse relationship between never-married motherhood and educational outcomes for children 
whose mothers are most affected by changes in race-specific or ethnicity-specific incarceration rates. 
                                                      
3 Charles and Luoh (2005) and Mechoulan (2007) use similar variables to study the effect of incarceration rates on 
female fertility, education, and marriage market outcomes. Unlike our paper, their studies do not address effects on 
children.  
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Moreover, particularly for Hispanics, we find evidence that these children may actually be better off living 
with a never-married mother. These results suggest that simply encouraging marriage for poor, unmarried 
mothers may not improve the welfare of their children, and could even worsen it depending on which 
marriages might be formed as a result of such policies. 
2. Family structure and child outcomes 
Much of the literature on family structure and child outcomes focuses on children raised in 
single-parent households, and establishes that such children are worse off, on average, than children who 
grow up with two parents (McLanahan 1985; McLanahan and Sandefur 1994).
4 However, these findings 
may overstate the causal impact of family structure on child outcomes because of unobservable factors that 
affect both, such as the quality of actual or potential spouses or the environment in which the family lives.
5  
Some studies try to account for unobservable factors associated with family structure by using 
longitudinal research designs, exploiting changes over time in a family’s structure. Using a sample of 
British and American children of divorced parents from the British National Child Development Study and 
the U.S. National Survey of Children, Cherlin et al. (1991) find that pre-divorce differences in test scores 
and behavioral problems explain half of the post-divorce difference in outcomes for boys and a smaller part 
of the difference for girls. Moreover, the estimated effects of divorce are insignificantly different from zero 
when the pre-divorce controls are included. In conflicting results, Morrison and Cherlin (1995) find that 
controlling for pre-divorce conditions does not attenuate the estimated relationship between family 
structure and the behavioral problems of boys from the Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth 1979 (NLSY79); with or without pre-divorce controls, they do not find significant effects for girls. 
Based on an analysis of numerous outcomes using the 1988 National Education Longitudinal Study, Painter 
and Levine (2000) conclude that “the correlations between family structure and youth outcomes appear to 
                                                      
4 This relationship holds for different levels of parental education and whether or not parents were ever married. The 
increase in single-parent households has been concentrated among women with less education, leading to a 
socioeconomic divergence in family structure and the associated negative outcomes of children residing in 
single-parent households (McLanahan 2004). 
5 See Ribar (2004) for a comprehensive review of the methods and studies used to assess the causal relationship 
between family structure and child outcomes. Our review in this section is selective, in part emphasizing research that 
contextualizes our own.   
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be largely causal” (p. 3). However, we read the evidence as a bit more mixed, although in some cases the 
results do suggest that prior characteristics of families and children do not fully account for the effects of 
family structure.
6 One potential problem with exploiting changes in family structure to identify the causal 
effects of family structure is that data sets typically yield only a small number of family structure switches. 
Researchers have also used information on siblings to estimate the effects of family structure on 
child outcomes, identifying the effects from within-family differences in exposure of children to particular 
family structures. Using a longer sample from the NLSY79, Ginther and Pollak (2004) find that living with 
both parents in families in which all children are the joint children of both parents (“traditional nuclear 
families”) increases education (and reading and math assessments) relative to blended two-parent 
households (whether stepchildren or the joint children of the parents) or single-parent households.
7 But the 
estimated differences become substantially smaller and often statistically insignificant when controls for 
family income, parent’s education, and other family characteristics are added. Using data from the British 
Household Panel Survey, Ermisch and Francesconi (2001) find that, cross-sectionally, children with longer 
exposure to single parenting have more negative education and health outcomes. When the authors look 
within families they find similar point estimates of the effects of single-parent family structure on A-level 
completion, early childbearing, and smoking patterns, but each effect is less precisely measured. Ermisch 
and Francesconi show that sibling effects can only be used to identify the causal effects of family structure 
if family structure itself is not a function of the idiosyncratic endowments of children. A related argument is 
that family structure may affect older and younger siblings differently (Lang and Zagorsky 2001)—for 
example, changes in family structure may affect the division of family resources between children—in 
which case the first-difference estimator may not net out unobserved across-family heterogeneity.
8 
Another approach is to explicitly model the family structure decisions of parents. Manski et al. 
(1992) attempt to account for selection with endogenous switching regressions. They find little evidence 
                                                      
6 Ribar (2004) shares this view of the evidence, summarizing their study as indication that “Controls for children’s 
initial characteristics reduced and in some cases eliminated the associations with family structure” (p. 28).  
7 One of the contributions of their paper is to use data on respondents’ siblings to characterize family structure, and 
therefore to look beyond, for example, the simple one- vs. two-parent distinction.   
8 Other sibling-difference studies include Grogger and Ronan (1995) and Sandefur and Wells (1999). In both studies,  
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that selection drives the relationship between non-intact family structure (i.e., a family with one parent, a 
parent and a stepparent, or no parents) and high school (or GED) completion, as the estimates in univariate 
probit and trivariate probit models are very similar in indicating that an intact family structure is associated 
with a higher likelihood of high school graduation. While these models can be identified by the 
distributional assumptions, Manski et al. (1992) exclude Census region-of-birth dummies, 
region-of-residence dummies, and an indicator for asymmetry in parents’ completed education from the 
child outcome equation, although it is difficult to argue that these variables affect child outcomes only 
through their effect on family structure. McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) use the same method to examine 
the effects of single parenthood; their results also indicate that selection does not drive the relationship 
between single headship and schooling outcomes of children. While these studies take seriously the 
endogeneity of family structure, in our view neither provides a compelling identification strategy.
9  
Quasi-experimental techniques are a popular way of trying to estimate causal effects. Using data 
from the NLSY79, Lang and Zagorsky (2001) use parent’s death as a “natural experiment” and find little 
evidence that parental absence affects test scores, educational completion, or future labor market outcomes. 
While this experiment likely estimates the average treatment effect of parental death, it is unclear if it 
measures the effects of divorce or never-married motherhood, since other factors associated with the death 
of a parent may differ. Gruber (2004) studies the effects of changes in divorce laws on outcomes for 
children. He finds that unilateral divorce laws increase divorce, and that children who live in states with 
no-fault divorce finish less schooling, have lower incomes, but are more likely to marry. However, this is a 
reduced-form analysis that does not identify the effect of family structure per se. For example, it does not 
tell us whether the impact comes from higher divorce induced by unilateral divorce laws, or a direct effect 
of the laws on bargaining between women and men within married households that in turn could impact 
investments in children. Nonetheless, work like this highlights the effects of legal institutions on family 
structure choices. Our research design exploits other sources of institutional variation that affect marriage 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the estimated effects of family structure are considerably smaller when the common family factors are removed.  
9 Manski et al. (1992) argue only that their exclusion restrictions “were suggested by … exploration of alternative 
specifications” (p. 29).    
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behavior, in a context where we are arguably better able to identify the causal effect of family structure. 
An important issue identified in this literature is that the relationship between family structure and 
child outcomes may vary depending on other family characteristics. A prominent example concerns the 
effects of divorce. A few studies have found that divorce is associated with improved outcomes for children 
in households in which, pre-divorce, their parents fight or argue often, with the opposite conclusion for 
“low-conflict” households (Amato et al. 1995; Jekielek 1998; Morrison and Coiro 1999). 
An example more closely related to our work is research that finds heterogeneous effects of family 
structure across the socioeconomic spectrum. Using a small sample of long-term welfare recipients in 
California, Ehrle et al. (2003) find that children living in non-intact family structures (including 
single-parent homes) had outcomes that were no worse than children living with two biological parents. 
Although Ehrle et al. caution against generalizing from their small sample, they find evidence that family 
environment can help to account for their results. In particular, they find that 60% of never-married mothers 
offered family environments that they classified as “low-risk,” about the same as for children living with 
two biological parents, and considerably higher than for other family structures, such as single, 
ever-married (39%), and married, living with stepfather (35%). Moreover, the children of never-married 
mothers have fewer family structure transitions, which the authors find are also harmful for children. Along 
similar lines, Grogger and Ronan (1995) find that fatherlessness does not appear to lead to lower education 
among blacks, and may even increase it.
10 Together, this evidence emphasizes that there may be a range of 
effects of family structure, and marriage may be a less effective or even ineffective means for improving 
child outcomes in some contexts, with some evidence suggesting that we may be less likely to find positive 
effects of marriage on children in families of lower socioeconomic status.
11 In empirical research on the 
effects of family structure, therefore, we have to be cognizant of how both the sample and the estimator 
might influence the answer. With regard to the second point, Gruber (2004) emphasizes the fact that in 
different empirical studies using alternative empirical approaches, the effects of family structure are 
                                                      
10 There are not many studies estimating the effects of family structure in race-stratified samples. 
11 This is not to say that all studies of at-risk populations find negligible or negative effects of marriage. For example, 
Liu and Heiland (2007) find positive effects in an urban sample that oversamples individuals of low socioeconomic  
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identified for those whose behavior is shifted by the variation in the data exploited by each approach—the 
marginal decision makers. 
In summary, it is clear that, on average, children who grow up outside of two-parent married 
households have worse outcomes than children who grow up in them. Yet there are important reasons to 
believe that these estimates overstate the direct effect of family structure on child outcomes. Many studies 
that attempt to correct for endogenous selection into marriage find diminished effects of family structure, 
but there is less agreement on whether the effects fall to zero or persist, with more literature pointing to the 
latter conclusion. The fact that in many studies the key finding is that the associations fall considerably after 
controlling for observable differences between families suggests that unobservable differences correlated 
with family structure may help drive the remaining associations. But identification strategies that grapple 
more seriously with selection on unobservables are not always convincing. In particular, there appear to be 
few opportunities to exploit exogenous variation in family structure to identify its effect on children. As 
stated by Gruber (2004) in his summary of the effects of divorce, “What is required to appropriately identify 
the impacts of divorce is an exogenous instrument that causes some families to divorce and others not, 
based on a factor independent of the determinants of their children’s outcomes. No previous study has been 
able to uncover such an instrument …” (pp. 806-7). We would argue that the same statement applies to the 
larger literature on the effects of family structure on child outcomes.    
We believe our paper makes an important contribution in this respect because we argue that 
incarceration rates have a direct effect on marriage markets, but in our specifications affect children’s 
outcomes only through their effects on marriage markets, allowing us to identify causal effects of family 
structure using an IV strategy. At the same time, we are sensitive to the possibility that there are 
heterogeneous effects of family structure, and that we identify these effects for families of low 
socioeconomic status whose decisions are affected by variation in incarceration rates. There is no 
compelling reason to believe that the effects identified from this source of variation generalize across the 
socioeconomic spectrum. On the other hand, the effects of marriage on children of mothers of low 
                                                                                                                                                                           
status.  
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socioeconomic status, and among these women those whose social milieu is likely to be affected by the 
incarceration of males, is an important policy question, as emphasized by the focus on marriage in the 
TANF legislation and its subsequent reauthorization. 
3. Marriage and nonmarital childbearing 
A rising proportion of births in the United States occur outside of marriage. In 1970, only 12% of 
new mothers were unmarried (DeVanzo and Rahman 1993); this number rose to 38% by 2005. But these 
statistics differ starkly by race and ethnicity: for black children, the proportion born to unmarried mothers 
was 70%; for white children, 25%; and for Hispanic children, 48% (Hamilton et al. 2006). There is also a 
substantial racial differential in the likelihood that parents marry after a nonmarital birth. Of unmarried 
parents who were romantically involved at the child’s birth, white and Hispanic parents were 2.5 times as 
likely as black parents to be married 30 months after birth. Using data from an urban sample of recent births, 
Harknett and McLanahan (2004) find that the 30-month marriage rates for nonmarital parents were 9.5% 
for black parents, 26.7% for white parents, 26.1% for Mexican-American parents, and 23.3% for other 
Hispanic parents.
12 Because fertility and marriage decisions vary substantially by race and ethnicity, we 
estimate our models for specific racial or ethnic groups.  
In this study, we examine the effect of never-married motherhood on child outcomes. 
Never-married motherhood is an understudied family structure category, but it is an increasingly important 
one. Among all children living in female-headed households, DeVanzo and Rahman (1993) reported in 
earlier work that households with never-married mothers were the fastest growing category. Bumpass and 
Lu (2000) report that for blacks the cumulative 5- and 10-year marriage rates following nonmarital first 
births declined steadily from the 1960s through the late 1980s. There is also a strong racial differential in 
the rate of never-married motherhood. While 80% of white children who end up in female-headed 
households do so as a result of their mothers’ separations, divorces, or widowhood, this is the route for less 
than half of all black children. In 1991, the majority of black children living in female-headed households 
                                                      
12 The propensity for prospective parents to marry after a nonmarital conception has also declined rapidly. Using data 
from the Current Population Survey’s Fertility Supplements, Akerlof et al. (1996) find that the decline in the rate of 
“shotgun marriage” (marriage after conception but before birth) between the late 1960s and the late 1980s accounted  
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lived with a never-married mother (DeVanzo and Rahman 1993). Below, we report statistics based on 
Census data showing rising rates of never-married motherhood through 2000, especially for minorities.  
One criticism of examining never-married motherhood as the family structure of interest is that 
some nonmarital births are to cohabiting parents whose family lives resemble those of married parents.
13 
However, few of the nonmarital births to black women occur during parental cohabitation. For black 
nonmarital births between 1970 and 1984, only 18% were to cohabiting parents (Bumpass and Sweet 1989). 
The equivalent rates for Mexican Americans and whites were 40% and 29%, respectively. After birth, a 
small proportion of children living with unmarried parents live with cohabiting ones (as opposed to living 
with single mothers or fathers). In 1990, 8.6% of black children living with unmarried parents lived with 
cohabiting parents (Manning and Lichter 1996). For whites and Mexican-American children living with 
unmarried parents, 15.4% and 17.6% lived with cohabiting parents. Moreover, based on data from the 
1980s and 1990s, Bumpass and Lu (2000) suggest that children born to never-married, non-cohabiting 
mothers spent only about 15% of their years from ages 0-16 in cohabiting households, versus about 36% of 
years with married mothers, and the rest in households headed by single females; those born to cohabiting 
mothers spend roughly equal amounts of time (about 25%) with cohabiting and non-cohabiting or 
non-married mothers. Together, these figures suggest that never-married motherhood is an important 
category to study, and probably most commonly reflects living in a single-parent household for a good part 
of one’s childhood, especially for black and Hispanic children.  
A number of demographic and institutional factors may have contributed to the rise of nonmarital 
family structures. Akerlof et al. (1996) posit that the increasing availability of birth control changed the 
expectations of potential fathers with respect to responsibility for children, and that low-income mothers, 
who are less likely to be able to afford birth control (and especially oral contraception), were more likely to 
be left by themselves to care for any unexpected offspring. In a theoretical framework of fertility and 
marriage decisions, Willis (1999) finds that if women are in excess supply and have relatively high incomes 
                                                                                                                                                                           
for 75% of the increase in nonmarital births for whites and 60% of the increase in nonmarital births for blacks. 
13 A second criticism,highlighted by DeLeire and Kalil (2002) and Ginther and Pollak (2004) is that simple 
classifications of family structure may mask additional heterogeneity. Nonetheless, to the extent that policy debate  
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(perhaps because of public assistance programs), a marriage market equilibrium may exist in which there 
are marital births to high-income parents, while low-income men have children with multiple female 
partners outside of marriage. Rosenzweig (1999) assesses the incentive effects of welfare benefits on 
nonmarital birth decisions and finds that higher benefit levels for Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
were associated with higher rates of nonmarital childbearing by women from the NLSY79.
14  
There is some evidence that local labor market conditions affect the probability of marriage after a 
nonmarital birth. This is an application of the hypothesis that the decline of marriage, for blacks in 
particular, is a function of the declining economic success of less-educated men (Wilson 1987). An 
empirical test of what is known as the Wilson hypothesis by Wood (1995) finds limited supporting evidence, 
but Harknett and McLanahan (2004) find that the employment rate of black men explains a large portion of 
the difference in marriage probabilities after childbirth. Neal (2004) shows that conflicting results from 
regressions of single-motherhood rates on marriage market prospects can arise once we realize that 
remaining single without children is also a viable option, and that women’s preferences for this status 
versus single motherhood can vary across marriage markets.
15  
Other work has examined how sex ratios affect marriage decisions. All else equal, a more 
asymmetric sex ratio should result in fewer marriages.
16 Using immigration waves as a shock to sex ratios, 
Angrist (2002) finds that higher male-to-female ratios had a large positive effect on marriage probabilities 
for women, even for the second generation of immigrants. His results also suggest that higher sex ratios 
(males per female) were associated with higher male earnings and incomes of parents with young children. 
Using variation in male incarceration rates by age, race, state, and year, Charles and Luoh (2005) find that 
higher incarceration rates (and lower male-to-female ratios) were associated with fewer married women.
17 
                                                                                                                                                                           
focuses on marriage per se, estimation of the effects of marital status on child outcomes is of interest. 
14 A recent study of the effects of TANF on children’s living arrangements finds mixed and imprecise evidence (Bitler 
et al. 2006). 
15 Neal also argues that the expansion of government aid to single mothers may have been the catalyst for the increase 
in single-motherhood rates, especially among the less skilled who otherwise would not have had the economic 
resources to raise children.   
16 Sex ratios may also affect women’s bargaining position within the household, and this may benefit children if the 
utility functions of women and men weight outcomes of their children differently (Chiappori et al. 2002). 
17 They also find that higher incarceration rates lead to a greater proportion of marriages in which the wife’s education 
was greater than the husband’s education. Charles and Luoh argue that this indicates that women find lower quality  
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In summary, the evidence on the growth of nonmarital family structures points to a number of 
important factors. First, there may have been a decline in the stigma associated with raising children outside 
of marriage. Second, there is some evidence that the structure of welfare programs gave a disincentive for 
poor women to marry after childbearing. And third, for low-income women there has been a decline in the 
marriageability of men because of reduced economic opportunities or increases in incarceration that have 
removed men from the marriage market. Our research complements this work on how sex ratios affect 
marriage markets and it also focuses on the low socioeconomic status, unmarried mothers that are the 
central subjects of much of this research and the focus of marriage policies. 
4. Empirical framework, identification, and estimation 
We assume that child outcomes (Y) are a function of family structure and a multitude of other 
factors, only some of which are observable (X). We estimate a model relating Y to the never-married status 
of the child’s mother (NM), and X:  
  Yi = β0 + β1NM i + Xiβ2 +εi, (1) 
where i indexes children. However, the estimated effect of never-married motherhood  ) ˆ ( 1 β  is biased if 
there is a correlation between never-married motherhood, NM, and the unobservable determinants of child 
outcomes in ε. As discussed earlier, it is easy to construct examples that can give rise to this correlation, 
pertaining either to the women themselves or their environments. Thus, never-married motherhood may be 
associated with worse child outcomes even if it has no causal impact on outcomes. In such a case there will 
be negative bias in  1 ˆ β , and regression estimates of Equation (1) will overstate the negative effects of 
never-married motherhood. 
Our strategy for identifying the causal effect of never-married motherhood on child outcomes is to 
use an instrumental variable that is correlated with never-married motherhood, but not correlated with the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
marriage partners when more men are incarcerated. However, it is difficult to characterize spousal quality only by 
education. For example, this ignores variation in the criminal records of men in marriage markets. 
Using incarceration data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Mechoulan (2007) reports some evidence pointing to 
a negative effect of incarceration of black males on marriage probabilities for black females, although the evidence is 
not robust; OLS estimates produce this effect, whereas IV estimates instrumenting for incarceration with changes in 
sentencing and prison capacity sometimes do and sometimes do not.  
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error term in the child outcome equation.
18 We propose to instrument for never-married motherhood with 
the male incarceration rate specific to each child i’s race or ethnicity (indexed by r) and state of residence 
(indexed by s), so that we have in mind the two-equation model:  
 
Yirs =β0 +β1NMirs + Xirsβ2 +εirs
NMirs =α0 +α1IRrs+ Xirsα2 +μirs,
 (2) 
where IRrs is the rate of incarceration for men of race/ethnicity r in state s who are aged 18-40 years, and μ 
is an error term. For the linear models written above, the parameter β1 is identified if IR is correlated with 
NM, but IR is uncorrelated with Y other than through its effect on NM. As discussed later, we offer an 
interpretation of our IV estimator as reflecting the behavior of those mothers (and their children’s 
outcomes) whose decisions to remain never-married are affected by variation in incarceration rates, based 
on local average treatment effects. While this interpretation implies, in contrast to Equation (2), that there is 
not a single treatment effect but instead that effects that can vary over the support of the instrument, 
Equation (2) is still a useful heuristic for thinking about the underlying structure.
19   
The causal connection of our instrumental variable, the race/ethnic- and state-specific incarceration 
rate, to women’s marital behavior is obvious. When more men are in jail or prison, there will likely be fewer 
marriages, both because fewer men are available for marriage, and because fewer men are good marriage 
partners.
20 The instrument must also be uncorrelated with the child-outcome error term (ε), so same-race or 
same-ethnicity incarceration levels must not be correlated with child outcomes other than through their 
effect on family structure. Incarceration rates are plausibly excludable from the outcome equation because 
recent increases in incarceration rates have not been caused primarily by corresponding changes in criminal 
behavior. Rather, some states have adopted harsher punishments for drug and repeat offenses, while the 
                                                      
18 In this discussion, we are presuming that the identification problem is not one of contemporaneous endogeneity 
between child outcomes and whether a child’s mother has married, although such endogeneity is possible. Instead, we 
have in mind selection of mothers into marriage (or never-married status) based on fixed characteristics that will also 
influence child outcomes. However, the instrumental variables strategy we implement addresses contemporaneous 
endogeneity as well.   
19 The formal treatment of causal effects in terms of potential outcomes or counterfactuals and the local average 
treatment effect interpretation is presented in Imbens and Angrist (1994).  
20 As Western and McLanahan (2000) point out, high incarceration rates may make men worse marriage partners both 
because of reduced economic opportunities and because of stigma attached to unmarried men with a history of 
incarceration (including the possibility that prior incarceration makes them more prone to future criminal activity).    
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general level of reported crime has not increased much (Blumstein and Beck 1999; Mauer 1999; Raphael 
and Stoll 2007).
21 
There are, of course, some potential threats to the validity of our instrumental variable. First, 
changes in criminal behavior cannot be ruled out, and it is possible that these directly affect child outcomes 
and are also reflected in incarceration rates. For example, geographic variation in the severity of the crack 
epidemic in the 1980s may lead to more crime and therefore higher incarceration rates, as well as adverse 
effects on children. Changes in criminal behavior because of worsened labor market prospects for 
low-skilled men, which can also have a direct relationship with child outcomes, can pose a similar problem, 
as can rising crime from de-institutionalization. To address these issues, we include measures of crime rates 
among the control variables in X, making it even more likely that the remaining variation in incarceration 
reflects policy rather than changes in criminal behavior that may affect child outcomes. We also include 
indicators of labor market conditions. In addition, year fixed effects control for aggregate changes in 
criminal behavior that are constant across states and not captured by the other included variables. 
Second, public expenditures on incarceration may be a substitute for expenditures on education. In 
this case, if we do not include controls for expenditures on education the error term in the child outcomes 
equation may be correlated with incarceration rates because the latter reflect (inversely) spending on 
education. We therefore control for state-level educational expenditures.  
The instrument can also be invalid if incarceration has direct effects on child well-being. This is 
more likely if incarcerated populations tend to come from neighborhoods with concentrated populations of 
blacks or Hispanics, in which case changes in incarceration rates could have an impact on the community 
other than through family structure. Suppose that incarceration has negative effects on the home 
communities of prisoners and therefore on child outcomes. This would lead to bias in the IV estimate 
pointing to stronger negative effects of never-married motherhood than do the OLS estimates, even if the 
                                                      
21 For example, Raphael and Stoll (2007) attribute most of the aggregate increase in incarceration to longer sentences 
and a greater likelihood of being incarcerated conditional on committing a crime (in particular, for less serious 
offenses); they attribute only one-fifth of the aggregate increase to increased criminality. Among the sources of 
increased criminality, Raphael and Stoll identify the de-institutionalization of the mentally ill population, declining 
labor market prospects for low-skilled men, and the crack cocaine epidemic.   
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true effect is weaker than suggested by OLS. It turns out, however, that in all of the IV estimations we report, 
the IV estimates are less indicative of adverse effects of never-married motherhood than are the OLS 
estimates, so eliminating this type of bias would only strengthen our conclusions.  
Suppose, conversely, that incarceration has a positive effect on the home communities of prisoners, 
perhaps by removing criminals from those communities who, for example, draw teenagers into crime and 
hence out of school. In this scenario, we might find that the IV estimates point to weaker adverse effects of 
never-married motherhood, or even positive effects, compared to the OLS estimate (and compared to the 
true effect). Given that this latter scenario does characterize the differences we find between OLS and IV 
estimates, our results could be explained by a direct positive effect of incarceration on child outcomes. This 
alternative explanation of some of our results is difficult to disentangle from the effects of incarceration via 
marriage. We come back to this point later.  
The child outcome we study is a discrete indicator for whether children drop out of high school. 
Other child outcomes are of interest, of course, but our estimation strategy requires that we use Census data, 
in which information on child outcomes is extremely limited. Although this outcome is binary, we estimate 
the effects of never-married motherhood on high school dropout using the linear probability formulation, 
because this enables a local average treatment effect interpretation of our IV estimator (as discussed below) 
and consistency of the estimates does not hinge on a correct assumption about the distribution of the error 
terms. In addition, the family structure variable capturing never-married motherhood is also a discrete 
indicator. We follow Wooldridge (2002, Chapter 18) and proceed by first estimating a probit for 
never-married motherhood, normalizing the variance of the error term to equal one. We then form the 
estimated probabilities ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ( 2 1 0 α α α i rs X IR + + Φ  and use them as the instrumental variable for NM in the 
equation for Y. We refer to this as two-stage IV (2SIV). This estimator is robust to misspecification of the 
equation for never-married motherhood as a probit. 
We also report two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates treating both equations as linear; these 
estimates turn out to be much less precise, although almost always of the same sign. The never-married 
motherhood rate is quite low, especially early in the sample period. As a result, linear probability estimates  
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of the first stage lead to many negative fitted values. This appeared to result in a much weaker first stage, 
which makes intuitive sense as the variation near and below zero in the estimates of the first stage estimated 
as a linear probability model are not associated with actual variation in never-married status.
22 However, 
the difference between the precision of the 2SIV and 2SLS procedures raises the possibility that the 
non-linearities in the exogenous control variables introduced by using a first-stage probit contributed to 
stronger identification of the model, which would be less reassuring because we cannot be confident that 
non-linear functions of the control variables do not actually belong in the model. Later, we assess 
identification of our model in light of this concern. 
It is important to clarify what we identify with this model. In particular, if we begin with the 
potential outcomes framework where the effect of never-married motherhood can vary over the support of 
the IV, then under assumptions specified in Imbens and Angrist (1994), the standard IV estimator is a 
weighted average of local average treatment effects with the weight concentrated on parts of the support of 
the IV for which variation in the IV has a greater impact on the endogenous variable. In our context, this 
implies that we are estimating the effects of never-married motherhood for the children of those women 
whose marriage behavior is affected by variation in the incarceration rate of men of the same race or 
ethnicity. These are likely to be families with women who have low skills and poor labor market prospects, 
and who likely face a less desirable pool of potential marriage partners.
23  
With any instrumental variables design there is a concern about the weak predictive power of the 
instruments, which can lead to large confidence intervals (and poor asymptotic approximations for them). 
In linear models with iid errors, Staiger and Stock (1997) show that 1/F is an approximate estimate of the 
finite sample bias of IV towards the OLS estimate. This leads to a rule-of-thumb threshold for F-statistics of 
                                                      
22 Using evidence from a Monte Carlo study, Angrist (1991) suggests that estimating a structure like ours with two 
linear probability models work as well as discrete choice models, but more recent work by Bhattacharya et al. (2006) 
reaches the opposite conclusion and, in particular, points to problems with predicted values outside the zero to one 
range in the first-stage linear probability model. 
23 Incarcerated men tend to have less education and worse labor market prospects (Pastore and Maguire 2006). 
Positive assortative mating on education in marriage markets is pervasive, and assortative mating on schooling and 
work behavior if anything strengthened during the sample period we study (Mare 1991; Pencavel 1998).  
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at least 10 for the first stage.
24 However, in the non-iid case less is known about the relationship between the 
correct F-statistic (in our case, clustering the data at the state level) and the properties of IV estimates. We 
nonetheless report this F-statistic for each specification.
25 We are also unaware of any such rules of thumb 
for the case of a generated instrument like in the 2SIV estimator we use, although as reported below there is 
no question that the generated instrument is a very strong predictor of never-married status.
 However, since 
we are in uncharted territory regarding test statistics that might mitigate concerns about weak instruments, 
we rely more on estimating a number of specifications intended to assess the robustness of the estimates to 
problems relating to weak instruments.  
5. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our primary data come from the Integrated Public-Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) of the 
1970-2000 Censuses (King et al. 2003). The Census data are not longitudinal and have limited information 
on child outcomes. But the IPUMS is suitable for this study because it has large samples and a set of 
variables with consistent definitions over a long period. The IPUMS is also ideal for calculating 
institutionalization rates over race/ethnicity-state-year cells. We use the 1970-2000 surveys because the 
greatest increase in incarceration occurred within this period (Pastore and Maguire 2006). The specific 
Census files used are the 1970 Form 2 state sample (a 1% sample of the population) and the 5% state 
samples from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses.
26 We restrict these samples to children whose race and 
ethnicity is identified as either Hispanic, non-Hispanic white, or non-Hispanic black.
27 Regression samples 
are further restricted to blacks and Hispanics for reasons discussed below. 
We want to study the effects on a child of the child’s mother not marrying after the child’s birth. 
Thus, we first restrict the sample to children living with their mothers.
28 We exclude children who are coded 
                                                      
24 Stock and Yogo (2005) suggest a critical value of 16.38 for the F-statistic for a single endogenous regressor and one 
instrumental variable.  
25 The rules of thumb for the F-statistic are easily met for estimates of the two linear equations if we cluster standard 
errors by state and year, which is the level at which incarceration rates vary in the models we estimate, but not if we 
cluster by state only, which is what we show in the tables. The latter F-statistic is robust to more deviations from 
standard iid assumptions on the error term, and hence is more likely to be valid as a test of restrictions on the 
instruments.   
26 The Form 2 sample is used for 1970 because the Form 1 sample does not have information about school attendance. 
27 Throughout the text, we refer to non-Hispanic whites as whites and non-Hispanic blacks as blacks. 
28 This definition excludes children living with neither biological parent. Bitler et al. (2006) shows that this is a  
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as residing in group quarters (institutional or otherwise) because it is impossible to determine their family 
structure. We are primarily interested in decisions of biological mothers, so we drop children who are 
identified in the IPUMS as probably living with a non-biological mother (usually a stepmother). We do this 
in part because it is unclear how incarceration rates would affect the remarriage decisions of 
non-incarcerated biological fathers.  
With this sample, we categorize children by whether their mothers report having ever married 
versus having never married. There are some children in the sample identified as living with married 
mothers who might have spent a substantial period of their childhood with mothers who were not married at 
the child’s birth and for part of the rearing of the child, but married later. If these children exhibit any of the 
effects experienced by children identified as living with never-married mothers at the time of the Census, 
then estimates of the effect of never-married motherhood would likely be biased toward zero. But this latter 
type of measurement error cannot by itself account for the finding that the IV estimate of the effects of 
never-married motherhood is the opposite sign of the OLS estimate, as the this type of measurement error 
would likely only introduce attenuation of the OLS estimate.
29 
We begin in Table 1 by showing some results on intermarriage. As shown in Panel A, for blacks 
and whites about 97-98% of married women are married to men of the same race, for the Census data in our 
sample period. Intermarriage has become only slightly more common during the sample period, so that 
within-race marriage rates in 2000 for whites were about 97% for whites and 95% for blacks. On the other 
hand, Hispanic-white intermarriage is more common, with about 16% of Hispanic married women married 
to white men. This difference between black and Hispanic marriage patterns might suggest that our IV 
procedure would be most powerful for black women, as for them variation in incarceration rates of men of 
the same race/ethnicity is likely to be most directly linked to the availability of marriage partners. However, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
nontrivial proportion of black children, especially those of less-educated household heads. In 1989, 9% of children 
living with a household head with at most a high school education lived with neither biological parent, while 15% of 
children living with a household head with fewer than 12 years of education lived with neither biological parent. 
29 At least, in a standard IV setting with a continuous right-hand side endogenous variable, the IV estimation corrects 
for measurement error in that variable as well.  If we think instead in terms of the Wald estimator of the local average 
treatment effect, then the bias may be to accentuate the estimate of this effect, as a higher incarceration rate leading to 
mothers spending more time unmarried even if they eventually marry implies that the predicted shift in never-married  
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as shown in Panel B of the table, Hispanic-white intermarriage is much less common among the 
least-educated Hispanics who are most likely to be affected by variation in incarceration rates; the marriage 
patterns indicate a Hispanic-white intermarriage rate of only about 4% for women with fewer than 12 years 
of completed education. Thus, variation in incarceration rates may provide as good an “experiment” for 
Hispanics as for blacks.     
Table 2 shows the percentage of children aged 15-17 years living with never-married mothers. For 
all racial and ethnic groups, there has been a secular increase in never-married motherhood. The relative 
increases are similar for whites, blacks, and Hispanics, but the absolute increase is by far the largest for 
black children. Fewer than 3% of black children aged 15-17 years lived with never-married mothers in 1970, 
while more than 21% lived with never-married mothers in 2000. 
We use cross-sectional data to examine the effect of family structure on child outcomes, so we must 
focus on educational outcomes that are observable while children still reside with their parents. We define a 
high school dropout variable that is equal to one if the child is not currently enrolled in school and has not 
completed 12th grade. Whether young people drop out of high school is a very important outcome to 
consider. By age 25, workers who graduate from high school have wages at least 20% higher than workers 
who do not complete high school or complete an equivalency diploma (Cameron and Heckman 1993). High 
school completion is also a strong negative predictor of criminal activity, arrest, and incarceration (Lochner 
and Moretti 2004) and a positive predictor of healthy behaviors and health (Kenkel et al. 2006). 
Table 3 shows the percentages of children in the sample who have dropped out of high school. For 
all race/ethnicity-year cells except one, the children of never-married mothers are more likely than the 
children of ever-married mothers to drop out of high school. However, these differences are smaller for 
blacks and Hispanics. In general, there has been a secular decline (since 1980) in the proportion of teens 
dropping out of high school. To control for other factors that may be driving these trends, such as 
educational policies, all of our models include year fixed effects.  
We also create a number of control variables from the IPUMS data. Using information from the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
motherhood as a result of higher incarceration may be understated.  
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mother’s record, we construct the following dummy variables for mother’s completed education (at the 
time of the Census): has not finished high school, has finished high school only, has finished only some 
college, and has finished at least four years of college. Table 4 shows that, compared with all other mothers, 
never-married mothers are 10 percentage points less likely to have completed four years of college, 2-3 
percentage points less likely to have had some college education (but fewer than four years) or to have 
completed only high school, and 15 percentage points more likely to have dropped out of high school. In 
addition to controlling for the mother’s education, we calculate the age of the mother at time of the child’s 
birth. Table 4 shows that never-married mothers have their children at an average age of 22.8 years, while 
other mothers have their children at an average age of 26.3 years. 
We also include some state-varying controls in our analysis. These controls account for 
consequences of incarceration policy that may affect children in ways other than through changes in family 
structure. First, since fiscal resources devoted to incarceration may be substitutes for public expenditures on 
education, we include per-pupil elementary- and secondary-school expenditures by state for the fiscal years 
1969-1970, 1979-1980, 1989-1990, and 1999-2000.
30 Second, since incarceration may be related to the 
level of crime, another set of controls takes into account state-year criminal activity. We use 3-year moving 
averages of the crime rates from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports. We control 
for the rates of violent crime and property crime (the two broadest crime categories) as well as larceny, 
which is a subset of property crime involving neither violence nor fraud.
31 Third, since levels of crime and 
incarceration may be a function of state labor market conditions that may also affect child outcomes, we 
control for the employment rate and mean annual earnings of men aged 18-40 by state and year from the 
IPUMS. To avoid endogenous effects of incarceration, we construct these statistics for white men.  
We use institutionalization rates as a proxy for incarceration rates. Ideally, our incarceration rates 
would come from administrative records from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). Unfortunately, the BJS 
                                                      
30 These data come from the Digest of Education Statistics 2005, which we accessed at http://nces.ed.gov/ 
programs/digest/d05/tables/dt05_167.asp on March 17, 2007. 
31 These data come from the website of the Bureau of Justice Statistics, which we accessed at 
http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/State/statebystatelist.cfm on May 20, 2007. The moving 
averages are our calculations. These three types of crime often enter significantly into the regression models.   
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does not publish data by state and race or ethnicity, and data they can make available with estimates by state 
and race or ethnicity are not considered reliable. Data from the decennial Censuses provide a suitable proxy, 
since they cover both the institutionalized and non-institutionalized populations and do an excellent job of 
sampling the institutionalized segment of the population. Census employees use administrative records if 
institutionalized respondents are unable to fill out the Census forms, so the institutionalized population is 
well accounted for in the IPUMS.  
The institutionalization rate is defined as the proportion of respondents residing in institutional 
group quarters, as identified by the group quarters question. Institutionalization rates are calculated from 
the full samples. The definition of institutional group quarters includes correctional facilities, mental 
institutions, and retirement facilities. Non-institutional group quarters includes military housing and college 
dormitories, and these individuals are excluded from the calculation of institutionalization rates. Butcher 
and Piehl (2007), based on 1980 Census data in which institutional categories were broken down, show that 
institutionalization is a very good proxy for incarceration when the sample is limited to adults no more than 
40 years old, because older individuals are more likely to be in mental or retirement institutions.
32 After 
calculating the rates, each child observation is assigned an institutionalization rate based on the child’s race 
or ethnicity and state of residence at the time of the Census.
33  
Despite institutionalization capturing incarceration well, there are other sources of error in 
measuring incarceration rates. Sampling error is more likely for minorities in small states because of small 
sample sizes, and sampling error is also more likely in 1970 than in the other years because the sample is 
one-fifth the size of the 1980-2000 samples. In addition, there is a potential aggregation problem because 
incarceration rates are calculated at the state level (the level at which the analysis is done), but they may 
have more local effects. However, since incarceration is not measured at the household level, there is no 
way to use Census data to construct more geographically disaggregated measures of incarceration.  
Figure 1 shows histograms for incarceration rates for men aged 18-40 years across states in 1980, 
                                                      
32 Raphael (2006) shows that the rates generated from the IPUMS are nationally comparable by race to the rates 
published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, which are generated by administrative records. 
33 We also constructed incarceration rates using the child’s state of birth from the Census 10 years before the child  
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1990, and 2000. In Figure 1, two things are apparent. First, incarceration rates for whites are low in all states, 
with all the observations clustered in the lower end of the distribution. In contrast, incarceration rates in 
most states are much higher for Hispanics, and more strikingly so for blacks. Moreover, for both minority 
groups incarceration rates clearly increased over these decades, again particularly for blacks. Figure 2 
shows the histograms of changes in incarceration rates across states over the periods 1980-1990, 1990-2000, 
and 1980-2000. These histograms show that there have been dramatic changes in incarceration rates for 
minorities, especially in some states, with the greatest changes between 1990 and 2000. It is this variation 
that is central to our identification strategy.
34 The lack of substantial changes for whites, coupled with low 
incarceration rates for them in general as well as low never-married rates, helps explain why we focus on 
minorities in our analysis. 
There might be some concern that increases in incarceration have been concentrated in particular 
geographic regions of the country, but Figure 3 shows that the states with the largest increases are 
geographically dispersed. States with no shading had the smallest increases in the incarceration rate for 
black men aged 18-40 years (or even slight decreases). States with the darkest shading had the greatest 
increases in these rates. Note that states with small, medium, and large increases in black incarceration are 
represented in all major regions of the country. 
Table 5 is a descriptive presentation of the first stage of the research design. Its cells show the 
percentage of children aged 15-17 living with a never-married mother. The columns are broken down by 
whether the child’s assigned incarceration rate is less than the 25th percentile, between the 25th and 75th 
percentiles, or greater than the 75th percentile. The incarceration-rate percentiles are calculated for each 
year of the sample and also for the pooled sample—to reveal how variation in incarceration rates is 
associated with the rate of never-married motherhood across states within each year, and for the sample as a 
whole.  Looking across the columns, the table provides relatively clear evidence that in states and years 
with higher incarceration rates the rates of never-married motherhood are higher for blacks and Hispanics, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
observation. Later, we describe the motivation for using these lagged incarceration rates and the corresponding results. 
34 There are some extreme values generated by small cells, but since we use individual-level data, these observations 
have an inconsequential influence on the results.   
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although there are some exceptions, especially in the early years in the sample for blacks. For white women, 
however, this pattern is not apparent, and within years white women appear to respond quite differently to 
higher male incarceration, as living in a state with less incarceration is associated with lower rates of 
never-married motherhood; for this reason and those discussed above, our analysis from this point on 
focuses on black and Hispanic children. 
6. Results 
Main Results 
Our full model relating educational outcomes of children to family structure is:  
  , 4 3 2 1 3 2 1 0 iast at a t s st iast iast iast D D D D S X NM Y ε δ δ δ δ β β β β + + + + + + + + =  (3) 
where Yiast is an indicator for high school dropout for child i, aged a years, living in state s in year t. NM  is 
an indicator for whether the child’s mother has never married. X is a vector of individual-varying controls, 
and S is a vector of state- and time-varying controls. We estimate all of the models discussed in this section 
separately for blacks and Hispanics, so there is no longer a subscript indicating race or ethnicity. The model 
also includes state dummy variables (Ds), year dummy variables (Dt), single-year age dummy variables (Da), 
and interactions between the year and age dummy variables (Dat); the latter allow for different aggregate 
changes by age. β1 is the parameter of interest that we expect to be positive in the single-equation model for 
high school dropout that does not account for endogenous selection, corroborating the evidence discussed 
earlier that the children of never-married mothers have worse outcomes. 
For the two-step instrumental variables estimator, a probit model of never-married motherhood is 
first estimated that includes the incarceration rate instrument and the exogenous controls and fixed effects 
used in Equation (3): 
  ], [ ] 1 [ 4 3 2 1 3 2 1 0 ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ α α α α at a t s st i st iast D D D D S X IR NM P + + + + + + + Φ = =  (4) 
where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution and IR is the incarceration rate for men of the same race or 
ethnicity as the children in the sample.
35 After estimating Equation (4), predicted values of never-married 
                                                      
35 The results we present below are robust to other specifications for this “zeroth” stage such as a logit regression.  
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motherhood are generated as  ] ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ [ ˆ
4 3 2 1 3 2 1 0 ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ α α α α at a t s st i st iast D D D D S X IR + + + + + + + Φ = Φ . Then, 
these predicted values of never-married motherhood serve as an instrument for never-married motherhood 
in a two-stage least squares model: 
 
. ˆ
4 3 2 1 3 2 1 0
4 3 2 1 3 2 1 0
iast at a t s st i iast iast
iast at a t s st i iast iast
D D D D S X NM
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 (5) 
In this two-step instrumental variables model, the estimated coefficient on never-married 
motherhood in the child outcome equation,  ˆ  β  1, is can be interpreted as the treatment effect of never-married 
motherhood on the relevant child outcome, identified for (and averaging over) those children whose 
mothers’ marriage behavior is affected by variation in incarceration rates (hence the local average treatment 
effect interpretation).   
  Before discussing our analysis of child outcomes, we present the estimates of the equations for 
never-married motherhood. Table 6 reports estimates from OLS and probit specifications, in all cases 
including the exogenous controls, and in the even-numbered columns including the incarceration rate as 
well. In all of the columns, we see that children of more highly-educated and older mothers are less likely to 
have never-married mothers. Turning to the even-numbered columns, for blacks the estimated coefficient 
on the incarceration rate in the linear probability model is 0.261 (Column 2), statistically significantly 
different from zero at the ten-percent level (p = .06). The analogous estimated marginal effect from the 
probit regression for blacks is 0.114 (Column 4), not statistically significant (p = .11).
36 For Hispanics, the 
OLS estimate of the coefficient on the incarceration rate is 0.671 (Column 6) and statistically significantly 
different from zero at the five-percent level. The analogous estimated marginal effect from the probit 
regression for Hispanics is 0.228 (Column 8), also statistically significant at the five-percent level.  To put 
these estimates in context, suppose we chose approximate modal increases in incarceration rates over the 
1980-2000 period—increases of 0.07 for black men and 0.02 for Hispanic men. These increases in 
                                                      
36 Note that this is a case where the marginal effects from the probit are somewhat different from the estimated 
coefficients of the linear probability model. This likely reflects the fact that the incidence of never-married 
motherhood is relatively low; this is the type of case where a linear probability model is less appropriate, which is why 
we focus on estimators that use probit specifications for never-married motherhood.  
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incarceration would correspond to a 1.8 percentage point increase (0.261 × 0.07 × 100 for OLS) in 
never-married motherhood for blacks and a 1.3 percentage point increase (0.671 × 0.02 × 100 for OLS) in 
never-married motherhood for Hispanics; the implied effects based on the probit estimates would be 
smaller. 
Table 7 shows estimates of the models for whether a child has dropped out of high school. For both 
blacks and Hispanics, children are more likely, on average, to have dropped out of high school if they live 
with a never-married mother. In the OLS specifications (Columns 1 and 4), blacks and Hispanics living 
with never-married mothers are 1.7 and 3.2 percentage points more likely to be have dropped out of high 
school, respectively. Given mean dropout rates at these ages of 6% for blacks and 7% for Hispanics, these 
are economically significant effects. 
However, the OLS results may provide biased estimates of the effects of never-married 
motherhood if there is nonrandom selection into family structure. The 2SIV estimates accounting for this 
nonrandom selection using the two-step instrumental variables estimator are reported in Columns 3 and 6; 
we show the 2SLS estimates in Columns 2 and 5. For both blacks and Hispanics, the estimated effects of 
never-married motherhood on whether a child has dropped out of high school become negative, and are 
significantly different from zero in the two-step estimator (Columns 3 and 6). For black and Hispanic 
children whose mothers’ marriage decisions are affected by variation in incarceration rates, never-married 
motherhood is estimated to reduce the likelihood that children drop out of high school, once we account for 
the endogeneity of their mothers’ marriage decisions. For Hispanics, the estimated effect of never-married 
motherhood might be viewed as quite large—certainly the 2SLS estimate appears suspect, but it is also very 
imprecise.   
Thus far the effect of incarceration on never-married motherhood was restricted to be linear. But 
the effects of incarceration on marriage markets may be nonlinear, becoming stronger when incarceration 
rates are high. To explore nonlinear effects of the instrument, Table 8 includes models with polynomials of 
incarceration rates in the first stage. The point estimates indicate that the effects of incarceration rates on  
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never-married motherhood are in fact stronger at higher incarceration rates.
37 Moreover, for blacks the 
estimated coefficient of the incarceration rate in the first-stage of the 2SLS estimation was only marginally 
significant for the simple linear specification in Table 6 (the F-statistics are reported in Table 7), whereas in 
this non-linear specification in Table 8 the instruments are jointly significant for both blacks and Hispanics. 
However, for the most part the second-stage results when non-linear effects of the incarceration rate are 
allowed in Table 8 are quite similar to those in Table 7.  The one difference is that, corresponding to the 
stronger first-stage, for the 2SLS estimates the standard errors are somewhat smaller and the estimated 
effects for Hispanics fall somewhat; the greater precision suggests that it is useful to introduce the 
non-linearities in the first-stage equation. Regardless, the qualitative conclusions are robust to this 
alternative specification. 
The estimates of the effect of never-married motherhood on whether children have dropped out of 
high school have two implications. First, they suggest that unobservable characteristics drive the selection 
into never-married motherhood and the negative school outcomes of the children of never-married mothers. 
And second, they suggest that the children of the women who choose to remain unmarried actually do better 
in terms of avoiding dropping out, for those women whose marriage decisions are affected by variation in 
incarceration rates.  
Identification and Robustness Checks 
 There are a few issues regarding identification that merit further consideration. First, it is apparent 
from comparing the 2SLS and 2SIV estimates in Tables 7 and 8 is that even when 2SLS is uninformative, 
the 2SIV estimator yields significant and robust results. A potential concern is that in the 2SIV estimation 
the inclusion of non-linear functions of the control variables in the fitted probability of never-married 
motherhood serves to identify the effect of never-married motherhood, rather than the variation in 
incarceration rates. We would not want to rely on this type of identifying information, however, because 
there is no reason to be highly confident that non-linear functions of the control variables should not 
                                                      
37 Although the estimated coefficients of the higher-order terms appear quite large, they are multiplied by numbers in 
the zero to 0.2 range, and yield reasonable predictions of the probabilities of never-married motherhood in the range of 
the data.   
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themselves appear in the model for high school dropout.  
To examine this possibility, we augment the set of control variables to include a large number of 
interactions and non-linear terms (all cross-products of dummy variables for the mother’s or child’s 
characteristics, and quadratics in all the continuous variables). When we did this, as reported in Table 9, the 
resulting 2SIV estimates were qualitatively similar to the baseline estimates in Table 7 in that the IV 
estimates of the effect of never-married motherhood on children dropping out of high school are negative 
rather than positive.
38 However, for blacks the estimate falls by about half and the standard error becomes 
larger, so that the estimated effect is statistically insignificant. For Hispanics, in contrast, although the 
estimate also falls by about half, to a more plausible magnitude of −.086, it remains nearly significant at the 
five-percent level (p = .052). Thus, the results for this approach point to some uncertainty regarding 
whether never-married motherhood actually reduces the likelihood of high school dropout for blacks, but 
the conclusion that it reduces this likelihood for Hispanics is robust. Moreover, the qualitative similarity of 
the estimates when the model is loaded up with nonlinear terms in the control variables leads us to conclude 
that the 2SIV estimator provides credible evidence that estimates that do not take account of selection into 
marriage may erroneously imply that never-married motherhood is bad for the educational outcomes of all 
children. 
Second, if incarceration rates have direct effects on child outcomes, so that the exclusion restriction 
underlying the IV estimation is invalid, then our estimates may instead simply be picking up the direct 
effect of incarceration, albeit still suggesting that higher incarceration leads to better outcomes for children. 
Although we account for environmental and policy differences across states by controlling for crime rates 
and education expenditures, we cannot rule out direct effects associated with incarceration even 
conditioning on these controls—in particular, effects of incarceration policy. 
We took a number of approaches to address this concern. One was to use 10-year-lagged 
incarceration rates for younger men (aged 18-24) from the birth state of the child as the instrument for 
                                                      
38 We do not report such estimates for the 2SLS estimator because in that case the identification comes solely from the 
variation in incarceration rates.    
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family structure, since these lagged incarceration rates are unlikely to directly affect dropout behavior.
39 
For blacks, lagged incarceration rates did not predict never-married motherhood significantly, whether in 
the linear or non-linear (quadratic or cubic) specifications. For Hispanics, however, the instrument was 
stronger, and the results reported in Panel A of Table 10 are quite similar to the earlier findings, indicating 
strong effects of incarceration on never-married motherhood (as reflected in the F-statistics), and estimates 
of the effect of never-married motherhood on the likelihood that children drop out of high school that are 
similar to the previous table, although a little weaker statistically (two significant at the ten-percent level, 
and the third, in Column 6, with a p-value of .11).
40 The slightly weaker statistical evidence relative to 
Table 9 is attributable to larger standard errors, which is perhaps not entirely surprising given that using 
lagged incarceration rates means that we discard information on the large changes in incarceration rates that 
occurred between 1990 and 2000 (shown earlier in Figure 2). Regardless, our confidence in the results for 
Hispanics obtained from the preceding estimates using contemporaneous incarceration rates is bolstered 
directly by these findings. For blacks, in contrast, the evidence is at best indirect, as we simply cannot tell 
whether the indication for Hispanics of the validity of the contemporaneous instrument used in the 
preceding tables necessarily carries over to blacks; it is not immediately obvious, however, why this would 
differ between blacks and Hispanics. 
A second approach is to revert to using the contemporaneous incarceration rate as an IV, but to use 
a narrower age range that excludes 18-24 year-olds whose criminal behavior might have a more direct 
effect on teenagers. Thus, Panel B reports estimates using the contemporaneous incarceration rate for 25-40 
year-olds. In the models with linear, quadratic, and cubic IV terms, we find results that are qualitatively 
similar to our baseline estimates in Tables 7 and 8.  Although not shown in the table, the results for blacks 
were also very similar to the earlier estimates.   
                                                      
39 This contrasts with the preceding results, which use the contemporaneous incarceration rate for 18-40 year-old men. 
It might seem that lagged incarceration rates are more appropriate instruments because they should be more strongly 
associated with the pool of potential spouses when decisions were made about bearing the children we study. On the 
other hand, because we are studying never-married status rather than out-of-wedlock childbearing, recent 
incarceration rates may be more important.  
40 We report the 2SLS as well as the 2SIV estimates, but given the earlier findings from this point on we focus only on 
the latter.   
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Finally, a more demanding approach is to continue to use the incarceration rate for men aged 25-40 
as an instrument, and to include the incarceration rate for men aged 18-24 as a control, since the 
incarceration of this younger cohort should not affect the marriage decisions of mothers with teenage 
children but, as noted above, might more likely affect teen outcomes.
41 As expected given what we found 
simply using lagged incarceration rates as IV’s, this approach was not informative for blacks. However, as 
reported in Panel C of Table 10, the results for Hispanics are again similar.
  
Table 11 presents a series of additional analyses and robustness checks. First, evidence discussed 
earlier finds differential effects of family structure for boy and girls, so we would like to know if our 
approach points to differences. This analysis may also help to address the identification issue. In particular, 
we might expect that any potential direct effects of incarceration on children may be more acute for boys 
than girls. Thus, if our conclusion that never-married motherhood reduces the likelihood of dropping out of 
high school holds only for boys, we might suspect that the evidence is driven by direct beneficial effects of 
incarceration on teenage boys.
42 The estimates stratified by sex of the child are reported in Panels B and C 
(Panel A repeats the baseline estimates for comparison). The 2SIV estimates for blacks are very similar for 
boys and girls. For Hispanics, we also find qualitatively similar evidence. Indeed, if anything for Hispanics, 
the effect of never-married motherhood in reducing high school dropout is stronger for girls than for boys, 
which, based on the reasoning above, implies that the results are not driven by a direct positive effect of 
incarceration of slightly older males on teenage boys. Thus, these findings lend further support to our 
argument that direct effects of incarceration do not confound our identification strategy. 
Next, we consider a couple of measurement issues. First, some prisoners are incarcerated outside of 
the state in which they previously resided. In that case, the measured incarceration rate in a state may 
inaccurately capture the extent to which men have been removed from the marriage market. To more 
accurately capture how incarceration might affect the sex ratio, the results in Panel D are based on 
                                                      
41 In this case, we stick with linear specifications of the effects of incarceration rates in the equation for never-married 
motherhood, even though the specifications with polynomials generally gave more precise IV estimates. We did not 
want to favor the incarceration rate IV for older men over the (linear) control simply via the inclusion of higher-order 
terms.  
42 We are grateful to Andrew Noymer for suggesting this test.    
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incarceration rates calculated only for men who currently reside in the same state they did five years before 
the Census.  The 2SIV estimates are qualitatively similar to our baseline estimates.
43  
Second, given the massive increase in adult incarceration, it is not surprising that there has been 
some increase in youth institutionalization.
44 Institutionalized youths are not in our sample because their 
family structures cannot be identified from the Census data. If teen institutionalization is positive correlated 
with being raised by a never-married mother (owing in part to higher incarceration rates of men) and with 
dropping out of high school, both of which seem plausible, then our IV strategy may put more weight on the 
best performing children of never-married mothers. To attempt to account for this, we estimated models for 
a sample including institutionalized children. We classified all of these children as having never-married 
mothers, imputing to their “mothers” the associated maternal controls for never-married mothers in the 
same state, year, and race/ethnic group. As reported in Panel E, in all cases the estimates become more 
positive, consistent with the possibility that our estimates are biased toward finding that never-married 
motherhood reduces high school dropout. However, the signs of the 2SIV estimates remain the same, and 
the estimate remains statistically significant for Hispanics. Since this approach in a sense assumes the 
worst—that all institutionalized children have never-married mothers—it no doubt overstates the extent to 
which our estimates might be biased by the exclusion of institutionalized children. The findings therefore 
establish that youth institutionalization is not mechanically driving our results. 
A final potential concern is that changes in other policies that affect schooling decisions may be 
correlated with changes in incarceration rates, biasing the IV estimates. Two policies of particular concern 
are compulsory schooling and minimum wage laws; minimum wages have been shown to reduce high 
school attendance among teenagers (e.g., Neumark and Wascher 2003) and compulsory schooling laws to 
increase it (e.g., Acemoglu and Angrist 2000). In Panel F of Table 11 we present estimates of models in 
which we control for the state minimum wage and for whether a child was covered by a compulsory 
                                                      
43 The 2SLS estimates are much closer to zero, and one is positive. 
44 For black children aged 15-17 years, the institutionalization rate was 1.3% over the sample period, increasing from 
0.3% in 1970 to 2.2% in 2000. For Hispanic children of the same ages, 0.8% were institutionalized over the sample 
period, increasing from 0.01% in 1970 to 1.1% in 2000.  
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schooling law.
45 The estimates for both blacks and Hispanics are almost identical to those from the baseline 
specifications.
46 Thus, changes in compulsory schooling requirements and minimum wages are not 
confounding our IV estimates. 
Summing up, our estimation and assessment of the robustness of the results to identification- and 
measurement-related issues leads to a few conclusions. First and foremost, in none of the 2SIV estimations 
do we obtain an estimate of the effect of never-married motherhood that is the same sign as the OLS 
estimate that does not account for endogenous selection into never-married motherhood. For both blacks 
and Hispanics, the sign of the IV estimate always indicates that never-married motherhood leads to a lower 
likelihood that children drop out of high school.
47 Second, the conclusions are stronger and more robust for 
Hispanics than for blacks. Although the 2SIV estimates are always negative for blacks, they are often 
insignificant, and the estimates are less robust to alternative specifications varying exactly how 
incarceration rates identify the effects of never-married motherhood, perhaps raising concerns about how 
well the identification strategy works for them.
48 For Hispanics, in contrast, the results are quite robust, and 
for a battery of specifications using our preferred (2SIV) estimator that are intended to gauge the strength of 
the evidence and the validity of the identification strategy, we always find significant or marginally 
significant evidence pointing to beneficial effects of never-married motherhood on children’s educational 
                                                      
45 Compulsory schooling laws come from various editions of the Digest of Education Statistics. Because a record of 
laws is not available for every year, we use the closest available listing of compulsory schooling laws: 1972 laws for 
1970, 1978 laws for 1980, 1989 laws for 1990, and 2000 laws for 2000. A child is coded as being covered by a 
compulsory schooling law if the child’s age is less than the maximum required age of compulsory schooling in a 
particular state and year. The minimum wage variable is the maximum of the state and federal minimum wages in 
1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, adjusted to 1983 dollars using the All-Urban series of the Consumer Price Index. 
46 Although not reported in the table, the point estimates confirm earlier research, with higher minimum wages 
increasing the likelihood of dropping out (significant for blacks) and higher compulsory schooling ages lowering it 
(significant for Hispanics).   
47 Regarding concerns about weak instruments, the evidence that our 2SIV estimates are quite different from our OLS 
estimates and of opposite sign, which suggests that problems of finite-sample bias of the IV estimates toward the OLS 
estimates owing to weak instruments cannot account for our results. But if the true confidence intervals for the 2SIV 
estimates are very large, then we would not want to embrace this conclusion with much confidence. The robustness 
analyses suggest, however, that these estimates are quite robust to a variety of specification choices, especially for 
Hispanics, which ought to help mitigate concerns about potential imprecision of the IV estimates. 
48 The weaker identification for blacks implies that it is more difficult to sort out direct effects of incarceration on 
teenage dropout from indirect effects acting through never-married motherhood. However, the direction of the effect 
of incarceration is the same regardless, which is also borne out by reduced-form estimates indicating a negative 
relationship between incarceration rates and teen dropout for blacks and Hispanics, using OLS or probit estimation. 
(These estimated reduced-form coefficients are insignificant, but that is not informative about the statistical 
significance of the effect of never-married motherhood.)  
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outcomes.   
Interpretation 
The finding that children of never-married mothers have better educational outcomes is likely to be 
regarded as surprising. However, the conclusion that partial correlations between never-married 
motherhood and child outcomes overstate the adverse effects of never-married motherhood is not surprising. 
Existing research, as explained earlier, often shows that adverse effects of non-traditional family structures 
are greatly diminished or even disappear once account is taken of possibly unobserved differences between 
families with different structures. One explanation for our particular results is that men likely to be 
incarcerated are from the left tail of the distribution of quality of potential spouses. When mothers who 
would have married these men had the men not been incarcerated decide not to marry, their children may 
grow up in better home environments on average. This is consistent with evidence from Ehrle et al. (2003) 
suggesting that, for long-term welfare recipients, never-married mothers offered low-risk family 
environments for their children. 
Indeed other evidence on low-income women backs up the notion that they often face poor options 
regarding the pool of marriageable males. Waller and Swisher (2006) note that low-income women are 
more likely than other women to experience physical abuse within their relationships with men—abuse that 
is likely to extend to children as well (see also Edin 2000). Edin and Reed (2005) discuss other evidence 
pointing to a poor pool of potential spouses in low-income communities.  Aside from physical and 
substance abuse, they note that many potential fathers have other children, and therefore that the benefits of 
marriage may be less likely to accrue to the woman’s children. Edin (2000) summarizes findings from her 
research as indicating that “though most low-income single mothers aspire to marriage, they believe that, in 
the short term, marriage usually entails more risks than potential rewards” (p. 113). She also documents 
low-income womens’ concerns over the ability of men in their communities to bring in a regular paycheck 
and avoid becoming a financial drain on the household, as well as concerns regarding men relying on 
criminal activity for their income. Moreover, findings in the studies just cited suggest a fair amount of 
overlap between women who are long-term welfare recipients and women whose potential marriage  
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partners are relatively likely to come from the population of criminal offenders and ex-offenders. For 
example, Waller and Swisher’s analysis of data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study points 
to an 11.7% rate of incarceration of fathers within 18 months of a child’s birth, and a 30.2% rate of 
incarceration prior to the birth.    
There is also evidence to suggest that incarcerated fathers have characteristics that may make them 
low-quality fathers. More than half of prisoners in the United States have children under age 18, and almost 
1.4 million children under age 18 had a father in state or federal prison at the end of 1999.
49 Of fathers in 
prison, 45% lived with their children at the time of their admission to prison. But traditional family structure 
was rare; almost half of the parents incarcerated in 1999 had never been married, and only 21% of 
incarcerated fathers lived in a two-parent household before their prison admission. Many incarcerated 
fathers were admitted because of violent offenses (42%) or drug trafficking offenses (16%), and nearly half 
the fathers in prison had a violent offense before their current admission, indicating a history of such 
offenses. Incarcerated fathers also report high levels of drug use prior to admission to prison; more than half 
(57%) reported illicit drug use in the month prior to their admission to prison, and 85% reported ever using 
illicit drugs (52% for cocaine or crack).
50 Incarcerated fathers reported relatively good employment levels 
before incarceration, but this statistic disguises a dependence on illegal activity for some of their income. Of 
fathers in prison, 73% report being employed in the month before their admission, but 27% relied upon 
illegal sources for at least part of their income. These statistics support the hypothesis that higher 
incarceration removes from the marriage market men who are less than ideal candidates for marriage or 
childrearing.
  
It is also possible that the OLS results indicating adverse effects of never-married motherhood are 
driven by environmental factors, with women who forego marriage, on average, living in environments 
where children do worse. This could explain IV estimates that indicate no effect of never-married 
motherhood (i.e., estimates that are diminished relative to OLS). But it is less plausible as an explanation of 
                                                      
49All of the statistics in this paragraph come from Mumola’s (2000) report for the Bureau of Justice Statistics on 
incarcerated parents. 
50 Waller and Swisher (2006) discuss research linking substance abuse by parents to poor parenting and worse  
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positive effects of never-married motherhood from the IV estimation. Since many of our estimates indicate 
such positive effects, we are more inclined to the interpretation based on selection on spousal quality. 
If we have identified the causal effect of never-married motherhood for the children of women 
whose decisions are affected by variation in incarceration rates, then one conclusion might be that 
never-married motherhood is not irrational for these women from the perspective of achieving positive 
outcomes for children. This is consistent with evidence that women with nonmarital births have worse 
marriage partners if they do get married. Qian et al. (2005) find that women with nonmarital births are more 
likely to have less-educated and older spouses than women without nonmarital births. On the other hand, 
this interpretation of our findings does raise the question of why these women marry when incarceration 
rates are not high, leading to worse outcomes for children. One answer, of course, is that marriage may 
bring other benefits that also enter into their decision making. 
Our evidence is also consistent with other findings that the effects of out-of-wedlock childbearing 
on the outcomes of both children and mothers exhibit some heterogeneity as a function of the relative 
disadvantage of the mother. For example, Levine and Painter (2003) study the effect of teenage 
out-of-wedlock childbearing on the educational completion of young mothers. They find that teenage 
childbearing has less deleterious effects for the least disadvantaged girls (as measured by the estimated 
probability of becoming a teenage mother). This research and ours indicates that women of different 
socioeconomic status might respond differently to policies aimed at promoting marriage. 
7. Discussion and Conclusions 
A rapid increase in the proportion of children living with never-married mothers and the negative 
child outcomes associated with living with a never-married mother have led to public policies that provide 
incentives or support for traditional, two-parent marriages. These policies rest upon the conjecture that the 
relationship between family structure and child outcomes is causal. In this paper, we identify the causal 
effect of family structure by instrumenting for never-married motherhood with the incarceration rate 
specific to the mother’s marriage market. For the sample of women for which this is a salient instrument, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
outcomes for children.   
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we find no evidence that never-married motherhood has a negative, causal effect on whether children drop 
out of high school. This result implies that, for some children, unobservable factors drive the relationship 
between family structure and educational outcomes. Indeed the evidence is more consistent with the 
conclusion that some children may be better off living with a never-married mother, and for Hispanic 
women and children this latter conclusion is rather strongly supported by the data and empirical analysis.   
Our instrumental variables approach has a policy-relevant interpretation. Changes in incarceration 
rates for men are most likely to affect the marriage market decisions of women of lower socioeconomic 
status. Therefore, our estimates reflect the outcomes of the children of these women, and likely the 
heterogeneity in the relationship between family structure and child outcomes. These children are 
particularly vulnerable to a host of negative outcomes in their education, labor market experiences, criminal 
behavior, and family lives. Proponents of marriage-promotion policies view marriage as a crucial step in 
reducing these negative outcomes. But our results demonstrate that marriage, in itself, does not necessarily 
make children better off, and suggests that efforts focused on the broader set of environmental factors that 
influence both child outcomes and family structure among those of low socioeconomic status may prove 
more productive, and conversely that marriage-promotion policies that ignore the background of potential 
husbands and wives could have adverse effects. This result is not completely contrary to the existing 
literature, which typically finds that cross-sectional associations overstate the strength of the relationship 
between family structure and child outcomes, but still often find beneficial effects of two-parent families, 
disadvantages of divorce, etc. As our review of the literature explained, however, for very low 
socioeconomic status populations, such as long-term welfare recipients, there is some evidence that the 
findings are reversed. 
It is also important to delineate the limitations of this evidence. First, none of our evidence 
addresses efforts to increase the quality of existing marriages or new marriages, which is also emphasized 
with respect to the Healthy Marriage Initiative.
51 If marriage-promotion policies create a set of marriages 
that on average are like those whose effects we identify, then our estimates provide valid information about 
                                                      
51 See, e.g., http://www.acf.hhs.gov/healthymarriage, accessed on September 28, 2007.  
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the effects of marriage-promotion policy on children. But if marriage-promotion policies lead to 
higher-quality, longer-lasting marriages, then the effects on children could be different. A second limitation 
of our evidence is that it has no implications for the effects of marriage on children in households that are 
not affected by variation in incarceration rates, since our results identify the effects of marriage for those 
women (and their children) whose behavior is affected by variation in incarceration rates.  
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Figure 1: Histogram of incarceration rates for men aged 18-40 years, across states, by race and ethnicity, 
1980, 1990, 2000 
 
Note: The unit of observation for each histogram is the state.  
 
Figure 2: Histogram of changes in incarceration rates for men aged 18-40 years, across states, by race and 
ethnicity, from 1980 to 1990, 1990 to 2000, and 1980 to 2000 
 
Note: The unit of observation for each histogram is the state. 
  
 




- No shading indicates a small change in the incarceration rate for black men (between -1 and +5.4 
percentage points). 
- Light shading indicates a medium change (between +5.4 and +9 percentage points). 
- Dark shading indicates a large change (between +9 and +22 percentage points). 




Table 1: Percentage of wives marrying husbands of particular 
races/ethnicities, all wives and high school dropouts, 1970-2000 
      Race/ethnicity of husband 
Year 
Race/ethnicity 
of wife  White  Black  Hispanic 
A: All wives     
All years White  97.81  0.46  1.73 
 Black  1.75  97.41  0.84 
 Hispanic  15.88  1.26  82.86 
        
1970 White 99.85  0.15  0 
Black 0.46  99.54 0 
Hispanic 0  0 100 
      
1980 White 98.15  0.34  1.51 
Black 0.91  98.5  0.59 
Hispanic 18.52 1.26 80.22 
      
1990 White 97.64  0.46 1.9 
Black 2.04  96.95  1.01 
Hispanic 18.86 1.23 79.91 
      
2000 White 96.66  0.77  2.56 
Black 3.11  95.49  1.4 
Hispanic 14.28 1.43 84.29 
        
B: Wives with fewer than 12 years of schooling 
All years White  97.83  0.43  1.74 
Black 0.83  98.66  0.51 
Hispanic 4.26 0.46  95.28 
      
1970 White 99.8  0.2  0 
Black 0.24  99.76 0 
Hispanic 0  0 100 
      
1980 White 97.62  0.38  2 
Black 0.64  98.76  0.6 
Hispanic 7.34 0.72  91.95 
      
1990 White 96.95  0.58  2.47 
Black 1.3  97.88  0.82 
Hispanic 4.72  0.4 94.88 
      
2000 White 94.96  1.07  3.97 
Black 2.21  96.13  1.66 
Hispanic 2.75 0.41  96.84 
Notes:        
- In 1970, Hispanic ethnicity was determined by the surname of the head 




Table 2: Percentage of children aged 15-17 
years living with a never-married mother, by 
race/ethnicity, 1970-2000 
  White  Black  Hispanic 
1970  0.1  2.7  0.4 
1980  0.1  7.1  2.0 
1990  0.5  15.8  3.7 
2000  1.1  21.2  5.4 
 
Table 3: Percentage of children aged 15-17 years who have 
dropped out of high school, by race/ethnicity and family 
structure, 1970-2000 
  Ever-married Never-married 
  mother  mother 
A: White children    
1970 4.9  11.1 
1980 5.0  15.9 
1990 4.9  8.5 
2000 2.4  5.3 
B: Black children    
1970 8.4  7.5 
1980 6.4  9.2 
1990 6.1  8.9 
2000 2.7  4.5 
C: Hispanic children   
1970 9.2  10.0 
1980 9.7  14.9 
1990 7.1  11.9 
2000 4.4  7.2  
 
Table 4: Selected descriptive statistics, children aged 15-17 years living with their mothers by race, ethnicity, and family structure, 1970-2000 
         Black  Black  Black  Hispanic Hispanic Hispanic White White White 
Variable All  NM  EM  All  NM  EM  All  NM  EM  All  NM  EM 
Never-married mother  0.03      0.13      0.04      0.01     
                        
Black 0.13  0.68  0.12                   
                        
Hispanic 0.10  0.16  0.10                   
                        
Child has dropped out of high school  0.05  0.07  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.05  0.07  0.09  0.07  0.04  0.07  0.04 
                        
Mother did not finish high school  0.23  0.37  0.22  0.34  0.35  0.34  0.53  0.58  0.53  0.17  0.22  0.17 
                        
Mother finished just high school  0.40  0.38  0.40  0.37  0.40  0.36  0.26  0.26  0.27  0.43  0.41  0.43 
                        
Mother finished some college  0.24  0.21  0.24  0.21  0.21  0.22  0.15  0.14  0.15  0.25  0.28  0.25 
                        
Mother finished college  0.14  0.04  0.14  0.08  0.04  0.08  0.06  0.03  0.06  0.16  0.09  0.16 
                        
Mother’s age at birth of child  26.21  22.83  26.30  25.20  22.44  25.63  25.75  23.90  25.83  26.44  23.43  26.46 
 (5.83)  (5.63)  (5.80)  (6.50)  (5.54)  (6.53)  (6.17)  (5.98)  (6.16)  (5.63)  (5.43)  (5.63) 
Incarceration rate for same-race/ethnicity     
    men 18-40 (st. of residence   0.017  0.059  0.016  0.063  0.077  0.060  0.023  0.029  0.022  0.009  0.012  0.009 
    × race/ethnicity × year)  (0.023)  (0.043) (0.021)  (0.036) (0.041) (0.035)  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.012)  (0.005)  (0.006) (0.005) 
Per-pupil school expenditures ($10,000)  0.70  0.78 0.70 0.68  0.76  0.66 0.72  0.84  0.71  0.70 0.83 0.70 
     (state × year)  (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.22) (0.22)  (0.19)  (0.23)  (0.19)  (0.22)  (0.20)  (0.22) 
Violent crime rate (1k per 100k population)  0.57 0.64 0.57 0.64  0.65  0.63 0.69  0.69  0.69  0.54 0.53 0.54 
     (state × year)  (0.26)  (0.27)  (0.26)  (0.28)  (0.28) (0.28)  (0.22)  (0.24)  (0.22)  (0.25)  (0.23)  (0.25) 
Property crime rate (1k per 100k  4.55  4.38  4.56  4.67  4.49  4.70  4.98  4.36  5.00  4.48  3.93  4.48 
     population) (state × year)  (1.27)  (1.22)  (1.27)  (1.24) (1.18) (1.24)  (1.40)  (1.36)  (1.40)  (1.25)  (1.11)  (1.25) 
Employment rate for white men 18-40  0.84  0.83  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.83  0.84  0.84  0.83  0.84 
     (state × year)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Mean annual earnings for white men   19.66  24.35  19.54  19.36  23.24  18.76  23.80  27.78  23.64  19.16  25.70  19.12 
     18-40 (state × year)  (8.62)  (8.16)  (8.59)  (8.51)  (8.06)  (8.42)  (9.04)  (8.23)  (9.04)  (8.42)  (7.30)  (8.41) 
Observations 1,513,288 38,674 1,474,614 197,166 26,409 170,757  156,935  6,188  150,747  1,159,187 6,077  1,153,110 
Notes: 
- Means shown with standard deviations in parentheses. 
- Family structure is broken down by whether mothers have never married (NM) or ever married (EM).  
 
Table 5: Percentage of children aged 15-17 years living with a 
never-married mother, by race/ethnicity, and by percentile of 
incarceration rate for men, 1970-2000 
  Percentile of state-year-race/ethnicity 
 incarceration  rate 
  ≤25th 25th–75th ≥75th 
A: White children     
1970 0.08 0.08 0.07 
1980 0.19 0.12 0.11 
1990 0.56 0.51 0.33 
2000 1.30 1.19 0.88 
Pooled  years 0.17 0.46 1.02 
B: Black children     
1970 2.74 2.67 2.60 
1980 7.64 7.06 6.55 
1990 16.09 15.47 16.50 
2000 19.69 20.60 24.33 
Pooled years 7.81  12.47  21.12 
C: Hispanic children     
1970 0.34 0.29 0.94 
1980 1.05 1.45 4.69 
1990 3.70 2.02 6.53 
2000 4.97 4.02 9.10 
Pooled  years 2.07 4.01 6.34 
Notes:      
- In the first four rows of each panel, percentiles are calculated 
separately for each race/ethnicity and year. 
- In the last row of each panel, percentiles are calculated for each 




Table 6: Regressions of never-married motherhood on incarceration rates, children aged 15-17 years living with their 
mothers, by race and ethnicity, 1970-2000 
   Black  Black  Black  Black  Hispanics Hispanics Hispanics Hispanics
Independent variables  OLS (1)  OLS (2)  Prob (3)  Prob (4)  OLS (5)  OLS (6)  Prob (7) Prob (8)
Incarceration rate     0.261      0.114      0.671      0.228  
     (st. of residence, year t)    (0.138)    (0.071)    (0.180)    (0.108) 
Female (child)   0.0014    0.0014    0.0012   0.0012   0.0025    0.0024    0.0022   0.0022 
 (0.0014)  (0.0014)  (0.0012)  (0.0012) (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0008) (0.0008)
Per-pupil educ. exp. ($1,000s)   0.097    0.077    0.029    0.020    0.062    0.029    0.006   -0.003  
 (0.036)  (0.041)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
Violent crime rate (1,000 crimes   -0.006   -0.011    0.013    0.011   -0.007   -0.006    0.019    0.019  
    per 100,000 pop.)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Property crime rate (1,000 crimes    0.016    0.022    0.018    0.021    0.010    0.012    0.011    0.013  
     per 100,000 pop.)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Larceny rate (1,000 crimes per   -0.037   -0.044   -0.038   -0.041   -0.018   -0.023   -0.024   -0.026  
    100,000 pop.)  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Employment rate for white men    0.397    0.382    0.255    0.239    0.079    0.033   -0.092   -0.124  
     aged 18-40 years  (0.175)  (0.161)  (0.132)  (0.125)  (0.111)  (0.102)  (0.048)  (0.050) 
Mean earnings for white men aged -0.0012   -0.0006    0.0000   0.0003   0.0019    0.0026    0.0001   0.0002 
     18-40 years ($1,000)  (0.0014)  (0.0015)  (0.0011)  (0.0012) (0.0011)  (0.0010)  (0.0007) (0.0007)
Mother is HS graduate  -0.055   -0.055   -0.047   -0.047   -0.012   -0.012   -0.009   -0.009  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Mother has some college  -0.103   -0.103   -0.074   -0.074   -0.019   -0.019   -0.013   -0.013  
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Mother has 4 years of college  -0.144   -0.143   -0.092   -0.091   -0.032   -0.033   -0.021   -0.021  
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Age of mother at birth of child  -0.0084   -0.0084   -0.0086  -0.0086  -0.0017   -0.0017   -0.0015  -0.0015 
 (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002) (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 197,166  197,166  197,122  197,122  156,935  156,935  156,715 156,715
R
2 0.08  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.03  0.00  0.00 
Mean of dependent variable  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04 
Notes: 
- Each specification includes child age effects, state effects, year effects, and child age-year effects. 
- For probits, estimates are marginal effects that are evaluated at the means of each regression’s respective sample. 




Table 7: Regressions of whether child has dropped out of high school on mother’s marital status, children aged 
15-17 years living with their mothers, by race and ethnicity, 1970-2000 
    Black Black Black  Hispanics Hispanics Hispanics
Independent variables  OLS (1)  2SLS (2)  2SIV (3)  OLS (4)  2SLS (5)  2SIV (6) 
Endogenous covariates        
Mother never married   0.017   -0.145   -0.031    0.032   -0.459   -0.190  
  (0.002) (0.148) (0.013) (0.003) (0.411) (0.067) 
Other controls        
Female (child)  -0.006   -0.006   -0.006   -0.007   -0.006   -0.007  
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Per-pupil educ. exp. ($1000s)  -0.003    0.012    0.001    0.058    0.089    0.070  
  (0.019) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.017) 
Violent crime rate   0.033    0.032    0.033    0.024    0.021    0.022  
     (1,000 crimes per 100,000 pop.)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.015) 
Property crime rate  -0.006   -0.004   -0.006    0.003    0.007    0.005  
     (1,000 crimes per 100,000 pop.)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
Larceny rate   0.004   -0.002    0.002   -0.006   -0.015   -0.010  
     (1,000 crimes per 100,000 pop.)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.023)  (0.020)  (0.022) 
Employment rate for white men aged   0.191    0.255    0.210    0.426    0.464    0.448  
     18-40 years  (0.080)  (0.109)  (0.077)  (0.085)  (0.100)  (0.083) 
Mean earnings for white men aged 18-40  -0.0002   -0.0004   -0.0002   -0.0009    0.0000   -0.0004  
     years ($1,000)  (0.0007)  (0.0008)  (0.0007)  (0.0009)  (0.0014)  (0.0009) 
Mother is HS graduate  -0.040   -0.049   -0.042   -0.046   -0.052   -0.049  
  (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) 
Mother has some college  -0.052   -0.069   -0.057   -0.054   -0.063   -0.058  
  (0.002) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.004) 
Mother has 4 years of college  -0.062   -0.085   -0.069   -0.064   -0.080   -0.071  
  (0.003) (0.023) (0.003) (0.005) (0.015) (0.005) 
Age of mother at birth of child   0.0002   -0.0012   -0.0002   -0.0002   -0.0011   -0.0006  
  (0.0001) (0.0013) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0002) 
First stage        
Incarceration rate     0.261        0.671    
     (st. of residence, year t)    (0.138)      (0.180)   
Predicted NM       1.268        1.234  
     (0.038)    (0.102) 
F-statistic for IV with state clustering    3.57 1136.94    13.96 147.19 
Observations  197,166 197,166 197,122 156,935 156,935 156,715 
R
2  0.03    0.04    
Mean  of  dependent  variable  0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Notes: 
- Each specification includes child age effects, state effects, year effects, and child age-year effects. 
- Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the state-level, are in parentheses. 




Table 8: Regressions of whether child has dropped out of high school on mother’s marital status with incarceration-rate 
polynomials in the first stage, children aged 15-17 years living with their mothers, by race and ethnicity, 1970-2000 
    Black Black Black Black  Hispanics Hispanics Hispanics Hispanics
Independent variables  2SLS (1) 2SLS (2) 2SIV (3) 2SIV (4) 2SLS (5)  2SLS (6)  2SIV (7)  2SIV (8)
Endogenous covariates              
Mother never married  -0.239   -0.052   -0.032   -0.029   -0.197   -0.302   -0.191   -0.185  
  (0.120) (0.124) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.329)  (0.331)  (0.067)  (0.068) 
Other controls              
Female (child)  -0.005   -0.006   -0.006   -0.006   -0.007   -0.007   -0.007   -0.007  
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Per-pupil educ. exp. ($1000s)   0.022    0.003    0.001    0.001    0.072    0.079    0.070    0.070  
  (0.024) (0.026) (0.019) (0.019)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Violent crime rate   0.032    0.033    0.033    0.033    0.023    0.022    0.022    0.022  
     (1,000 crimes per 100,000 pop.)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Property crime rate  -0.002   -0.005   -0.006   -0.006    0.005    0.006    0.005    0.005  
     (1,000 crimes per 100,000 pop.)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Larceny rate  -0.006    0.001    0.002    0.002   -0.011   -0.012   -0.010   -0.010  
     (1,000 crimes per 100,000 pop.)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
Employment rate for white men aged   0.293    0.218    0.210    0.209    0.444    0.452    0.448    0.447  
     18-40 years  (0.100)  (0.093)  (0.077)  (0.077)  (0.091)  (0.093)  (0.083)  (0.083) 
Mean earnings for white men aged  -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002  -0.0005   -0.0003   -0.0004   -0.0005 
     18-40 years ($1,000)  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0011)  (0.0012)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)
Mother is HS graduate  -0.054   -0.044   -0.042   -0.042   -0.049   -0.050   -0.049   -0.049  
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Mother has some college  -0.079   -0.060   -0.057   -0.057   -0.058   -0.060   -0.058   -0.058  
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Mother has 4 years of college  -0.099   -0.072   -0.069   -0.069   -0.071   -0.075   -0.071   -0.071  
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Age of mother at birth of child  -0.0020 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002  -0.0006   -0.0008   -0.0006   -0.0006 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)
First stage              
Incarceration rate  -0.214    0.675        0.008   -0.588      
     (st. of residence, year t)  (0.345)  (0.663)      (0.512)  (0.797)     
Incarceration rate squared   1.985   -7.094        7.546    23.442      
     (st. of residence, year t)  (1.225)  (6.451)      (5.081)  (15.879)     
Incarceration rate cubed     26.686        -111.278      
     (st. of residence, year t)    (19.089)       (106.902)     
Predicted NM       1.267    1.266        1.236    1.255  
     (0.038)  (0.039)      (0.102)  (0.112) 
F-statistic for IV with state clustering  5.27 3.99  1123.99 1063.67 10.50 12.84  145.51  125.56 
χ
2-statistic for incarceration rate 
      6.45  8.71      5.72  10.72 
     variables in probit                 
Observations 197,166 197,166 197,122 197,122 156,935  156,935  156,715  156,715
Mean of dependent variable  0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07 
Notes: 
- Each specification includes child age effects, state effects, year effects, and child age-year effects. 
- Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the state-level, in parentheses. 
- 2SIV is the two-step IV procedure described in Wooldridge (2002, p.623).  
 
 
Table 9: Regressions of whether child has dropped out of high school on mother’s marital status 
(and with additional interactions of controls), children aged 15-17 years living with their mothers, 
by race and ethnicity, 1970-2000 
   Black  Black  Hispanics  Hispanics 
Independent variables  OLS (1)  2SIV (2)  OLS (3)  2SIV (4) 
Endogenous covariates      
Mother never married   0.018   -0.016    0.031   -0.086  
  (0.002) (0.027) (0.003) (0.044) 
Other controls      
Female (child)   0.000    0.000   -0.002   -0.001  
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Per-pupil educ. exp. ($1000s)   0.082    0.084    0.140    0.139  
  (0.064) (0.062) (0.073) (0.073) 
Violent crime rate   0.058    0.061   -0.017   -0.011  
     (1,000 crimes per 100,000 pop.)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.067)  (0.069) 
Property crime rate  -0.036   -0.036    0.030    0.023  
     (1,000 crimes per 100,000 pop.)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
Larceny rate   0.029    0.028   -0.069   -0.064  
     (1,000 crimes per 100,000 pop.)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.051)  (0.052) 
Employment rate for white men aged  -0.568   -0.795    7.608    8.078  
     18-40 years  (1.396)  (1.396)  (3.266)  (3.505) 
Mean earnings for white men aged 18-40   0.003    0.002    0.001    0.001  
     years ($1,000)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Mother is HS graduate   0.111    0.108    0.162    0.165  
  (0.060) (0.061) (0.071) (0.074) 
Mother has some college   0.194    0.188    0.193    0.227  
  (0.071) (0.074) (0.089) (0.095) 
Mother has 4 years of college   0.159    0.147    0.175    0.185  
  (0.075) (0.076) (0.121) (0.126) 
Age of mother at birth of child  -0.001   -0.001    0.005    0.004  
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
First stage      
Predicted NM     1.258      1.113  
   (0.059)    (0.093) 
F-statistic for IV with state  clustering   454.42  142.40 
Observations  197,166 197,122 156,935 156,715 
R
2  0.03  0.04  
Mean of dependent variable  0.06  0.06  0.07  0.07 
Notes:        
- Estimates are only shown for main effects of control variables. Additional controls include 
quadratics of continuous variables and interactions between the gender of child and mother’s 
education, between the gender and age of child, between the mother’s age at birth of child and 
mother’s education, and between mother’s completed education and age of child. 
- Each specification includes child age effects, state effects, year effects, and child age-year effects.
 - Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the state-level, are in parentheses. 




Table 10: Alternative estimates of regressions of whether child has dropped out of high school on mother’s marital 
status, children aged 15-17 years living with their mothers, Hispanics, 1970-2000 
     Hispanics Hispanics Hispanics Hispanics  Hispanics Hispanics
   Independent variables  2SLS (1) 2SLS (2) 2SLS (3) 2SIV (4)  2SIV (5) 2SIV (6) 
A. Lagged incarceration for men 18-24, from birth state of child, as instrument with polynomials 
  Mother  never  married  -0.118 -0.140 -0.016 -0.091 -0.092 -0.086 
    (0.196) (0.203) (0.138) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) 
  First stage        
  Incarceration  rate  0.733  0.448  -0.949     
       (state of birth, year t-10, men 18-24)  (0.283)  (0.310)  (0.543)       
  Incarceration rate squared    5.022  62.114       
       (state of birth, year t-10, men 18-24)    (6.550)  (21.075)       
  Incarceration  rate  cubed     -525.655    
       (state of birth, year t-10, men 18-24)      (158.375)      
 Predicted  NM        1.390  1.392  1.366 
          (0.123) (0.124) (0.119) 
  F-statistic for IV  6.71  3.80  4.47  127.22  126.76  132.75 
B. Incarceration for men 25-40 as instrument with polynomials 
  Mother  never  married  -0.333 -0.086 -0.240 -0.188 -0.187 -0.184 
    (0.446) (0.404) (0.311) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
  First stage        
  Incarceration  rate  0.504  0.130  -0.746     
       (state of birth, year t, men 25-40)  (0.147)  (0.427)  (0.616)       
  Incarceration rate squared    3.808  23.771       
       (state of birth, year t, men 25-40)    (4.305)  (9.184)       
  Incarceration  rate  cubed     -112.254    
       (state of birth, year t, men 25-40)      (40.465)       
 Predicted  NM        1.241  1.239  1.253 
          (0.106) (0.105) (0.110) 
  F-statistic for IV  11.75  5.47  13.73  137.39  140.44  130.98 
C. Incarceration rate for older men as an instrument and incarceration rate for younger men as a control 
  Mother never married  0.057      -0.168     
    (0.612)    (0.063)    
  Incarceration  rate  -0.488    -0.338    
       (state of residence, year t, men 18-24)  (0.353)      (0.235)     
 First  stage        
  Incarceration  rate  0.376       
       (state of birth, year t, men 25-40)  (0.155)           
  Predicted  NM      1.250    
        (0.102)    
  F-statistic for IV  5.90      149.58     
Notes: 
- Each specification includes child age effects, state effects, year effects, and child age-year effects. 
- Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the state-level, in parentheses. 
- 2SIV is the two-step IV procedure described in Wooldridge (2002, p.623). 




Table 11: Robustness checks from regressions of whether child has dropped out of high school on mother's marital 
status, children aged 15-17 years living with at least their mothers, by race/ethnicity, 1970-2000 
     Black  Black  Black  Hispanics Hispanics Hispanics 
   Independent variables  OLS (1)  2SLS (2)  2SIV (3)  OLS (4)  2SLS (5)  2SIV (6) 
A. Baseline specification 
 Mother never married   0.017   -0.145   -0.031    0.032   -0.459   -0.190  
    (0.002) (0.148) (0.013) (0.003) (0.411) (0.067) 
  First-stage  F-statistic    3.57 1136.94    13.96 147.19 
B. Sample consists of boys only 
  Mother never married   0.018   -0.200   -0.035    0.029   -0.384   -0.094  
    (0.002) (0.295) (0.018) (0.004) (0.492) (0.071) 
 First-stage  F-statistic    2.29  702.75    10.73  136.15 
C. Sample consists of girls only 
  Mother never married   0.017   -0.109   -0.033    0.035   -0.502   -0.263  
    (0.003) (0.110) (0.014) (0.005) (0.476) (0.099) 
 First-stage  F-statistic    2.77  1367.70    12.33  99.21 
D. Incarceration rate instrument calculated for men who live in the same state they did 5 years earlier 
  Mother never married   0.017   -0.007   -0.025    0.032    0.011   -0.196  
    (0.002) (0.150) (0.013) (0.003) (0.378) (0.068) 
  First-stage  F-statistic   9.19  916.87   7.14  113.89 
E. Baseline sample plus institutionalized children, classified as having never-married mother 
  Mother never married   0.040    0.010   -0.003    0.060   -0.298   -0.151  
    (0.002) (0.128) (0.012) (0.007) (0.281) (0.061) 
  First-stage  F-statistic    7.49 1088.94    18.54 140.55 
F. Specification includes compulsory schooling and minimum wage controls 
  Mother never married   0.017   -0.145   -0.031    0.032   -0.441   -0.193  
    (0.002) (0.149) (0.012) (0.003) (0.382) (0.068) 
  First-stage  F-statistic    3.65 1102.36    16.95 147.55 
Notes: 
- Each specification includes child age effects, state effects, year effects, and child age-year effects, except Panel G, 
which includes child age effects, state-year effects, and child age-year effects. 
- Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the state-level, in parentheses. 
- 2SIV is the two-step IV procedure described in Wooldridge (2002, p.623). 
- In all specifications, the covariates included are the same as in Table 7, except the female indicator is excluded 
from Panels B and C. 
- In Panel E, mother-specific covariates are imputed for children not living with a mother, from a sample of children 
living with a never-married mother. 
 
 
 